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1 Chapter 1: Introduction and methodology 
  
1.1 Scope and objective of thesis 
The topic of this thesis is European legislation regarding “hate speech”, with specific 
emphasis on Holocaust denial.  It contends that Europe is not justified in imposing 
limitations on freedom of speech in this respect, because such laws are not necessary or 
effective in achieving their primary objectives while imposing limitations on individual 
and group rights.  On both a legal and philosophical level, individual rights should be 
preserved and protected when there is no objective reason for their limitation.  
Justifications for limiting freedom of expression in Democracies must be within 
boundaries that support and respect individual and group rights to self-determination.  
Democracies are based upon the principle that the people are the ultimate source of 
power and that the government exists to promote their wellbeing.  In order to make 
social and political decisions, the people must have access to information.  The more 
fettered this access is, the less people are able to make choices and draw conclusions 
about how they want to be governed.   
Limitations on individual freedoms in Democracies must be justified.    This is 
especially true of freedom of expression since it is so central to the functioning of 
democracy; limitations on freedom of expression are limitations on democracy itself.  
Therefore, the state has the burden of proof to show that any limitations that it seeks to 
impose are necessary and that the same objective could not be achieved by less invasive 
means, since it is seeking to abridge the individual’s right to express an opinion.  
 This paper contends that states and international institutions have not met that burden 
of showing that limitations on freedom of expression are justified in the area of 
Holocaust denial and hate speech legislation, and that they have not gone far enough to 
protect freedom of expression.  By basing these limitations on socially accepted norms, 
both states and international institutions fail to protect legitimate speech that falls 
outside of generally accepted ideas.1  
                                               
1 The ICCPR has never found in favor of someone seeking protection for right wing ideas.  The ECHR has 
stated in the Lehideux and Isorni v. France case, ECHR 1998, that Art.17 of the ECHR could be so broadly 
applied that most controversial political ideas would to be outside the scope of protections of the ECHR.  
This case will be discussed in detail later on.  
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This is an important area for research not only because people in Europe are imprisoned 
for expressing opinions which in other Democracies2 would be seen as either protected 
speech, or a crime not warranting imprisonment.  It is also important, because such 
limitations are a limitation upon participatory democracy.  If one is not able to express 
one’s own opinions and try to convince others of their validity, a democracy cannot 
exist.  Therefore, it is important to understand that a limitation on freedom of 
expression is also a limitation on democracy itself.3   
 
1.2 Methodology 
My thesis will be based on an interdisciplinary approach of using both legal and 
philosophical material to evaluate the necessity and appropriateness of Holocaust denial 
and hate speech legislation. First I will examine national legislation and international 
treaties and court cases pertaining to limitations on freedom of speech.  I will analyze 
both those cases which have found such limitations to be justified and those cases 
which have found such restrictions to be an unconstitutional.4  Cases will be selected to 
provide a thorough understanding of the right of freedom of expression under the 
international instruments, as well as cases from national courts.  These cases will also 
be compared with provisions from national constitutions within Europe as well as rights 
guaranteed though the European Convention on Human Rights.  This examination will 
supply the legal fundamentals of the problem.   Second, in addition to analyzing the 
pertinent cases, this paper will discuss the philosophical justifications and political 
considerations which are used to support the existence of such laws and the limitations 
of freedom of which they entail.  The national laws and international instruments and 
the court decisions applying them will then be examined in the light of legal and 
philosophical arguments from varying national and international judicial systems to 
determine if the state has legitimate cause to limit freedom of speech in such a manner.  
 
                                               
2The US, Canada, and Australia would not imprison people for this type of speech. 
3 Certain general restrictions on speech are common to all Democracies.  These include laws against 
libel of individuals and direct incitement of violence.  These types of limitations, which are narrowly 
aimed at preventing injury to individual or group rights, not the prohibition of the expression of opinion 
about historical or political subjects, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
4 Contrast Garudy v. France , EHCR 2003, with Spanish Constitutional Court Judgment No. 235/2007, of 
November 7.  
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1.3 Justification 
Limitations on freedom of expression are one of the most important issues within any 
democracy.  The right to freedom of expression is so important that the United States 
puts that right in the First Amendment in its Bill of Rights.5  With democracy and 
freedom of expression being so inter-related6, it is difficult to limit any aspects of 
freedom of expression, without in turn limiting, to some degree, democracy and the 
ability of people to share and examine the ideas of others.  “Extreme speech” or in the 
case of this thesis, Holocaust denial and hate speech, is that which tests a society’s 
commitment to open debate and toleration of opposing views, even if those views be 
shocking, disturbing and/or erroneous.  A democracy is based on the tenet that people 
should have free access to information without fear of harm or punishment so that they 
can evaluate competing arguments in determining how they should best be represented 
and governed. 
Few can have sympathy for the ideas of Holocaust deniers and perhaps the preferred 
response to their ideas is disgust.  However in imposing such limitations, one must 
thoroughly examine the need for them.  This thesis will argue that the limitations placed 
on people through memory laws and hate speech laws breach of the rights of 
individuals groups to self-determination, and therefore constitute a violation of their 
basic human rights, since they are restrictions based purely on social values rather than 
real danger.  Along with violating this fundamental right to self-determination, 
pragmatic and philosophical problems arise from the limitation of such speech in a 
democracy.  It is an important question within our societies as to what we can tolerate 
and what we cannot.  I assert that greater toleration will led to better outcomes for 
society and that society at large must not fear the expression of an argument, so devoid 
of fact and commonsense, that if it were not dealing with such a sensitive topic it would 
be laughable.   
 
                                               
5 The First Amendment to the US Constitution states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”  
6 As discussed below the Australian court held that the word “democracy” implied freedom of speech.  
Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
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1.4 Definition and scope of Holocaust denial 
Holocaust denial essentially consists of denying that crimes against humanity were 
committed by the Nazis.   Generally one of the following claims is made in denial 
literature: 
• That the Nazis did not use gas chambers to murder millions of 
Jews. 
• That most of those who died at concentration camps such as 
Auschwitz succumbed to diseases such as typhus rather than being executed 
• That although crimes may have been committed against the Jews, 
the Nazi leadership was unaware of the nature and extent of those 
crimes. 
• That it is a gross exaggeration to say six million Jews were killed. 
• That trumped-up claims of atrocities against the Jews were used cynically to 
generate political support for the expropriation of Palestinian land 
to create a Jewish homeland. 
• That the number of Jews killed in the so-called Holocaust pales in 
comparison to the number of dissidents and Christians killed in 
Soviet gulags. 
• That academics are afraid to speak the truth about these matters for 
fear of being charged with anti-Semitism.7 
 
Holocaust denial and hate speech are intertwined concepts; often Holocaust denial is 
prosecuted under hate speech laws where there is no direct legislation outlawing it.8   
Holocaust denial, which is often called “negationist literature”, is a subset of hate 
speech and general memory laws.  Holocaust denial is somewhat different from general 
hate speech in that it focuses on the denial of a specific historical fact.  The Holocaust is 
also unique in that specific legislation often accords it the status of unquestionable 
historic fact, by prohibiting its denial.  
In order to avoid prosecution under the Holocaust denial laws, the proponents of 
Holocaust denial, have attempted to present their arguments in the guise of “pseudo-
science.”  In this form, Holocaust denial does not always make blatant claims about 
ethnic groups.  But, even when it does not make explicit claims against ethnic groups, it 
often implies negative claims against such groups.  In this form, it is much more 
difficult to distinguish Holocaust denial from academic inquiry. 
                                               
7Points quoted from: Teachout, Peter R. “Making “Holocaust Denial” a Crime: Reflections on European 
Anti-Negationist Laws from the Perspective of U.S. Constitutional Experience” Vermont Law Review 
Volume 30 Number 3, Spring 2006, accessed last May 6, 2010 at 
http://lawreview.vermontlaw.edu/articles/v30/3/teachout.pdf 
8 See: Section 4.1 of this paper on National Legislation. 
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2 Chapter 2: Freedom of speech is essential for the existence of 
democracy 
Democracy and freedom of expression are inseparable ideas.  In order for one to 
influence the government, one must have the ability to exchange ideas. This connection 
is so strong that Australian courts have found a protected right to freedom of expression 
merely in the word “democracy”. 
Australia, in turn, deliberately refused to adopt a bill of rights. But when the 
Australian Parliament passed a law prohibiting televised political advertising and 
instead allotted free time to parties and candidates, the Australian High Court 
measured this law against a constitutional right to free speech although no such 
right was to be found in the text of the constitution. 
The High Court reasoned that the constitution declares Australia to be a 
democracy, and that there is no way to be a democracy without recognition of 
freedom of speech.  The right was therefore in the Court’s view implied in the 
notion of democracy, at least is so far as political speech is concerned. 9 
The preceding quote demonstrates both the interconnectedness of the concepts of 
democracy and freedom of expression and, also, the dilemma faced by Democracies.  
While freedom of speech is necessary for Democracies to exist, some argue that not all 
speech need be protected.  There is a paradoxical tension between limitations on 
freedom of expression and democracy.  Since, one must be able to freely express one’s 
views in order to influence democracy, limitations on this right are limitations on 
democracy itself.   If a government is to be considered a democratic society, such 
limitations must be used only when absolutely necessary.  
However, democracy does not require a completely libertarian view of freedom of 
speech and certain limitations are required for a democratic society to work.  For 
example, the instigation of violence against others would create an environment where 
people were unable to exercise their rights under a democracy.  All Democracies limit 
speech in cases such as libel, blackmail and incitement to violence.10 Such limitations 
are different in kind from laws prohibiting Holocaust denial and hate speech laws in 
                                               
9 Grimm, Dieter; “Freedom of Speech in a Globalized World” found in Extreme Speech and Democracy 
(2009), p.11, commenting on the holding in Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. V. Commonwealth, 
(1992) 177 CLR 106. 
10 Though the extent of these limitations varies amongst countries as well. 
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that they apply narrowly to protect individual rights rather than broadly to prohibit the 
expression general opinions conducive to a free exchange of ideas.  Holocaust and hate 
speech prohibitions are more easily extended to apply to legitimate expression critical 
of the way their government is run and how their officials act.  Restrictions on these 
ideas are particularly troubling to democratic ideals.  
C. Edwin Baker in his article “Autonomy and Hate Speech” makes a twofold argument.  
(i) that the legitimacy of the state depends on its respect for people’s equality and 
autonomy and (ii) that as a purely formal matter, the state only respects people’s 
autonomy if it allows people in their speech to express their own values---no 
matter what these values are and irrespective of how this expressive content 
harms other people or makes government processes or achieving governmental 
aims difficult. Achievement of more substantive aims, such as helping people 
experience fulfillment and dignity, must occur with a legal structure that as a 
formal matter respects people’s equality and autonomy. 
      * * * 
Democratic legitimacy, I believe, and certainly the civil libertarian commitment, 
requires that, in advancing people’s substantive autonomy as well as in advancing 
substantive egalitarian aims and other proper policy goals, the legal order neither 
have the purpose to nor use general means that disrespect people’s formal 
autonomy (or their formal equality). On this view, respect for free speech is a 
proper constraint on the choice of collective or legal means to advance legitimate 
policy goals. Typically racist hate speech embodies the speaker’s at least 
momentary view of the world and, to that extent, expresses her values. Of course, 
her speech does not respect others’ equality or dignity.  It is not, however, her but 
the state’s legitimacy that is at stake in evaluating the content of the legal order. 
Law’s purposeful restrictions on her racist or hate speech violate her formal 
autonomy, while her hate speech does not interfere with or contradict anyone 
else’s formal autonomy even if her speech does cause injuries that sometimes 
include undermining others’ substantive autonomy. For this reason, prohibitions 
on racist or hate speech should generally be impermissible—even if arguably 
permissible in special, usually institutionally bound, limited contexts where the 
speaker has no claimed right to act autonomously—such as when, as an 
employee, she has given up her autonomy in order to meet role demands that are 
inconsistent with expressions of racism.11  
Freedom of opinion is an absolute right.12  It is a fundamental contradiction to say that 
one has the right to his opinion, but that he is prohibited from expressing it.13   It is 
necessary element for a democracy to function that people have the right to express 
                                               
11 ibid. p. 143 
12 See: Article 18 of the ICCPR, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Adopted and opened 
for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
1966), and Article 9 of ECHR, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Rome 1950. 
13 Though this is in many countries considered “forum internum” verses “forum externum” or simply 
inward belief and outward manifestation, limitations are permitted of the latter. 
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their opinions, even if that right is used in an offensive, shocking or insulting way.  
Under these circumstances, every restriction upon the free exercise of speech must be 
judged by whether it is absolutely necessary to protect some legitimate interest of the 
state or its people, whether it is drafted as narrowly as possible to accomplish its goals, 
and whether the same goals could be not attained by other less restrictive means.  
 It is the contention of this paper that Holocaust denial and hate speech laws are not 
required to protect any legitimate interests in present day Europe. More than sixty years 
have passed since the defeat of National Socialism and there has been no serious 
attempt to revive it.  While such laws may have been justified in the period just after 
World War II when European institutions and economy had been destroyed and were in 
a weakened condition, there is no proof that they are needed today.  No one has made 
any serious attempt to make a rational argument for the necessity for these laws today.  
They are remnants of the past and are justified on emotional, not rational grounds.   
For Germany, there is great political pressure to admit the atrocities committed by 
National Socialism.  Holocaust denial laws are a way for Germany to say that it will 
never allow this to happen again.  Though such laws may be politically expedient, that 
alone does not justify the limitation of individual rights of free expression. Everyone 
condemns the atrocities which were committed by the Nazis, but that does not justify 
the necessity for these laws today.  It is time for Europe to subject these laws to serious 
scrutiny to see if they are needed. 
In order to justify such prohibitions, one must show that there is some causal connection 
between the prohibited speech and conduct which threatens legitimate interests of the 
state or its people.  Then, one must show that the laws are effective in attaining their 
purpose with the least possible limitations on individual freedoms.  It is the contention 
of this paper that Holocaust denial and hate laws fail on both counts.  It has not been 
demonstrated that they are either necessary or effective. 
America allows greater freedom of speech in these areas than Europe and still maintains 
its democratic institutions.  There is no empirical evidence that such prohibitions are 
more effective in dealing with hatred as a belief than simply letting it be freely 
expressed and judged in the market place of ideas.  Europe is moving away from 
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blasphemy laws, which like Holocaust denial and hate speech laws, prohibit offensive 
expression.  It is time that it also moved past Holocaust denial and hate speech laws. 
  
  10
3 Chapter 3: Development of Holocaust denial and hate speech 
legislation in Europe 
 
The first trial dealing with propaganda related to the Holocaust was at the Nuremberg 
trials, although it did not concern Holocaust denial explicitly.  At Nuremberg, Julius 
Streicher was convicted of war crimes and executed, though he had nothing to do with 
the actual perpetration of those war crimes.  He was a Nazi propagandist, and as such 
was held responsible for creating an atmosphere in which the crimes of the Holocaust 
could be committed.  The Nuremberg Court held that: 
 
Striecher's incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews in the East 
were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly constitutes persecution on 
political and racial grounds in connection with war crimes, as defined by the Charter, 
and constitutes a crime against humanity.14  
 
Holocaust denial has been seen as an attempt to rehabilitate the Nazi ideology by 
distorting the understanding of history to make it more palatable, thereby creating the 
threat of its possible return.  It is in an attempt to prevent the spread of such ideologies 
like National Socialism, that States have adopted legislation such as making Holocaust 
denial illegal.  Holocaust denial has been prosecuted under hate speech clauses in 
national legislation, as well as direct legislation prohibiting Holocaust denial.   Because 
of is proximity to the devastation caused by National Socialism, the nations within 
Europe are far more wary of extreme speech than other democracies such as those in 
North America and Australia that were not affected so directly.15  After the Nuremberg 
trials, Democracies throughout Europe adopted anti-hate speech legislation, and 
legislation aimed at prohibiting Holocaust denial.  
 
                                               
14 See The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Judgement: Streicher, available at  
< http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judstrei.asp> (last accessed 13 April 2010). 
15 However, there have been criminal prosecutions in both Canada (R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731: The 
Supreme Court of Canada reversed the defendant’s conviction after holding that the law under which 
he was prosecuted was unconstitutional) and Australia (Jones v. Toben, [2002] FA 1150: The defendant 
was ordered to stop publishing his material and when he did not do so, he was sentenced to jail for 
contempt of court).  Unlike the many European cases, neither of these defendants were sentenced to 
prison as a result of their speech; the defendant in the Australian case was jailed for contempt of court 
after he refused to stop publishing.  
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3.1  National legislation prohibiting holocaust denial and hate speech  
Fourteen separate European States now criminalize Holocaust denial.16  "The European 
states that now criminalize Holocaust denial posit that such denial constitutes an 
attempt to justify crime, incites hate crime, or seeks to undermine the findings of the 
International Military Tribunal of August 1945 (the Nuremberg Tribunal)."17  National 
legislation dealing with Holocaust denial is important both in itself and because of the 
deference paid to it by both the ECHR and the UN Human Rights Council.  Europe is 
the only region in the world that has strict legislation dealing directly with Holocaust 
denial, but it is not alone in having expansive legislation creating a category of hate 
speech.  European countries have used various laws to combat Holocaust denial.  
Austria has direct legislation on the matter of Holocaust denial.  Article 3h of the 
Prohibition Act (Verbotgesetz)18 makes it a crime to deny the National Socialist 
genocide, or other National Socialist crime against humanity, or to seek to minimize or 
justify them.  The law provides for imprisonment for one to ten years, or for up to 
twenty years, if the offender or his activities are particularly dangerous. 
Other countries that have similar legislation prohibiting Holocaust denial are: 
Belgium19, the Czech Republic20, France21, Germany22, Liechtenstein23, Lithuania and 
Luxembourg24.   
Though all of these countries have similar legislation, the penalties vary in severity, 
with Austria having the harshest penalty.  Austria’s law predates most other such 
legislation, having been enacted in 1947, and was originally aimed at banning any 
revival of Nazism through banning the political party.  In 1992 the law was amended to 
make Holocaust denial illegal.  The Austrian law against Holocaust denial permits the 
incarceration of people for up to 20 years if they are deemed particularly dangerous, 
though the standard sentence is 1 to 10 years.  In contrast, German legislation, which 
                                               
16 See: Whine, Michael; “Expanding Holocaust Denial and Legislation Against It”, found in Extreme 
Speech and Democracy (2009) P. 543 
17 ibid. 
18 Osterreich, StGBI 13/1945, amended version BGBI 148/1992, cited in ibid., p. 544 
19 Article 1 of the law of 23 March 1995, Belgium 
20 Article 261a of the amended constitution of 16 December 1992, Czech Republic 
21 Article 24 bis of the amended Press Act of 29 July 1881, France 
22 Article 130 of the amended Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany 
23 Article 283 of the Penal Code of Liechtenstein 
24 Article 457-3 of the revised Criminal Code, Luxembourg 
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was enacted in 1994, has a maximum sentence of 5 years.  France has also adopted 
tough anti-denial legislation; it amended its Press Act of 29 July 1881, under the 
Gayssot Act of 1990.  France had previously punished Holocaust denial in Civil Court, 
but did not have legislation making denial a criminal offense.   
Other countries have prosecuted Holocaust denial under hate speech laws. These laws 
have the limitation of only applying to Holocaust denial when it can be considered 
spreading hatred.  While both national and international courts have taken broad views 
of what constitutes spreading hatred, there still a question whether merely denying the 
existence of the Holocaust without making other anti-Semitic claims is spreading 
hatred. 
The most notable example of this use of hate speech legislation is the United Kingdom, 
which has prosecuted Holocaust denial under legislation used to combat hate speech.  
Holocaust denial was legal in the UK prior to the enactment of the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act (1994) and the Crime and Disorder Act (1998), but afterwards the UK 
has successfully prosecuted cases of Holocaust denial under these laws where hatred 
was also incited.25  This has led to a decrease in the amount of publications of 
Holocaust denial in the UK, whereas before, Britain was the European center of 
Holocaust denial.  The Netherlands has also used hate speech legislation to prosecute 
Holocaust denial.26, 27 
Switzerland has enacted legislation prohibiting the denial of any genocide.28  This type 
of legislation has problems of its own.29  But it has at least provided consistency in 
prosecuting denial of any genocide, rather than just singling out the Holocaust. 
                                               
25 “Lady Jane Birdwood was convicted in April, 1994 for possessing and distributing threatening, 
abusive, and insulting literature that contained Holocaust-denial statements; Charlie Sargent, Will 
Browning, and Martin Cross were convicted for stirring up racial hatred in 1994 for publishing Combat 
18, a magazine that denied the Holocaust; Nick Griffin and Paul Ballard were convicted in April, 1998 for 
publishing The Rune magazine, which contained denial material; Simon Sheppard was convicted in June 
2000 for publishing leaflets that contained statements ridiculing the Holocaust.”  Whine, op. cit. P. 539 
Note: 5 
26 Siegfried Verbeke and Ivo Janssen were both convicted under Article 137 of the Netherland’s Criminal 
Code which makes it illegal to defame, or incite religious or racial hatred. 
27 Notably Spain also had legislation making it illegal to deny the Holocaust, until such law was ruled 
unconstitutional by the high court in 2007.  The specifics of that case will be discussed further on. 
28  Whine, op. cit. p. 546  
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Europe, under the presidency of Germany in 2007, has further tried to move forward 
and make Holocaust denial legislation more uniform throughout the region. They did 
this with the Framework Decision on racism and xenophobia, which called upon all 
member states to enact legislation criminalizing, among other things,  intentional 
conduct publicly (1) inciting to violence or hatred against groups or persons deined by 
reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin or (2) condoning, 
denying or grossly trivializing crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity or war 
crimes when the conduct is carried out in a manner likely to incite to violence or 
hatred.30 
The original language met opposition from countries, including the UK, Ireland, Italy 
and some of the Scandinavian States, which were concerned about freedom of 
expression issues.  In order to obtain passage, language had to be added to sections 1(c) 
and 1(d) to make it clear that Holocaust denial and other hate speech was illegal only 
when it was used in such a way as to incite violence or hatred against such persons. 
Provisions were also added to sections 2 to 4 to limt the requirements to enact such 
legislation. 
While some European nations have concerns over freedom of expression regarding 
Holocaust denial legislation, not all of them share this and prosecutions continue.  
Recently many high profile people have been convicted of Holocaust denial31 and fined 
or incarcerated for periods of up to five years and less famous cases have been 
numerous. 
The momentum to institute criminal proceedings, however, has not diminished in 
recent years, and some states continue to demonstrate their commitment to persecute 
offenders.  According to the Austrian authorities, for example, more than two 
hundred criminal convictions were secured under their prohibition statue from 1999 to 
2006.32  
 
                                                                                                                                         
29 The concept of genocide is a modern concept and it is difficult to apply to those events in the past 
before the concept existed, such as the killing of the Native Americans, or the deaths of millions of 
Indians under the British Raj.  It is difficult to see people being prosecuted for denying these events.   
30 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and 
expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, available at 
 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32008F0913:EN:HTML> (accessed on 
April 13, 2010) 
31 David Irving in Austria, Germar Rudolf  in Germany, Ernst Zündel in Germany, Sylvia Stolz in Germany.   
32 Whine, op. cit. p. 549 
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Despite the UK’s objections to limitations under this Act, it has prosecuted people for 
Holocaust denial under new laws that came into effect in the 1990’s, but only where it 
was clear that racial hatred and bigotry were present.33  
 
3.2  Holocaust denial and hate speech provisions in international instruments 
 Generally, protection of freedom of expression is weaker under regional and 
international treaties than under many national laws, and the deference paid by the 
international bodies to national laws has further weakened the protections, because 
many cases are found to be outside the scope of the treaties.  
Both the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and ICERD 
(International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination) 
have limited the protection of freedom of speech.  The UN Human Rights Committee 
stated in the case of Faurisson v. France34, that the ICCPR does not protect Holocaust 
denial and ICERD calls directly for bans on speech disseminating ideas of racial or 
ethnic superiority.  While neither deals directly with Holocaust denial in its text, 
prohibitions against hate speech have been found to be applicable to Holocaust denial. 
 
3.2.1  ICCPR 
The UN Human Rights Committee has ruled consistently that hate speech is not 
protected under ICCPR.  The articles that protect speech under the Covenant are 
Articles 19 and 20.  Article 19 is concerned with protections of speech and Article 20 
deals with necessary restrictions to freedom of speech.                        
  Article 19 
                 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.  
 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice.  
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but 
these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:  
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;  
                                               
33 See footnote 25 
34 Robert Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993 , U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993(1996)      
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(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public 
health or morals.  
Article 20  
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.  
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.35  
 
 Article 20 calls on States to enact legislation providing that “Any advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence shall be prohibited by law”36.  This positive obligation on states to limit 
freedom of speech has met resistance from the US and the US has made a reservation 
against it.37  
 
3.2.2  ICERD 
Article 4 of The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD)38, states as follows: 
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas 
or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, 
or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and 
undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all 
incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the 
principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights 
expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia:  
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial 
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence 
or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or 
ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the 
financing thereof;  
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other 
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall 
recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by 
law;39  
                                               
35ICCPR,  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966) 
36 ICCPR, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966) Art. 20 
Para. 2 
37 See US reservation at:  See: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec 
38 While ICERD has not been used directly to prosecute Holocaust denial, its text clearly disallows it and 
states that have not made reservation to ICERD would be required to legislate against Holocaust denial 
where it incited racial hatred. 
39 CERD, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Adopted and 
opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965) 
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A substantial number of countries, most notably the UK and the US, have taken issue 
with this Article and have placed reservations on it so that it would not impair the 
freedom of speech rights of their people.   In its First General Comment, the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination which monitors ICERD has 
chastised members who failed to implement legislation banning speech that would fall 
under article 4. 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
Committee found that the legislation of a number of States parties did not include the 
provisions envisaged in article 4 (a) and (b) of the Convention, the implementation of 
which (with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of the Convention) is 
obligatory under the Convention for all States parties.  
The Committee accordingly recommends that the States parties whose legislation was 
deficient in this respect should consider, in accordance with their national legislative 
procedures, the question of supplementing their legislation with provisions conforming 
to the requirements of article 4 (a) and (b) of the Convention.40 
The reservation entered by the United States states that the prohibitions mandated by 
Articles 4 and 7 of the ICERD are not reconcilable with the US constitution:  
That the Constitution and laws of the United States contain extensive protections of 
individual freedom of speech, expression and association. Accordingly, the United 
States does not accept any obligation under this Convention, in particular under articles 
4 and 7, to restrict those rights, through the adoption of legislation or any other 
measures, to the extent that they are protected by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.41 
 CERD had this to say about the US reservation: 
[T]he prohibition of dissemination of all ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred is 
compatible with the right to freedom of opinion and expression, given that a citizen’s 
exercise of this right carries special duties and responsibilities, among which is the 
obligation not to disseminate racist ideas.42  The Committee recommends that the State 
party review its legislation in view of the new requirements of preventing and 
combating racial discrimination, and adopt regulations extending the protection against 
acts of racial discrimination, in accordance with article 4 of the convention.43  
 
                                               
40 General Recommendation No. 01: States parties' obligations (Art. 4): 25/02/72. Gen/Rec/No.01 
41 Declarations and Reservations US to CERD accessed on May 6, 2010, at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
2&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec 
42 The Committee uses circular reasoning here to justify this prohibition, i.e. one can prohibit racist 
speech because it is prohibited.  
43 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Concluding observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United States of America’ 14/08/2001. 
A/56/18,para. 391 
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3.3 Trend in international law to limit hate speech to protect minority rights 
Since the adoption of the ICCPR and ICERD there has been a continued trend to limit 
racist speech within international agreements and to create greater regard for minority 
groups and peoples that might face prejudice.  
A… distinct development, has been the growth of anti-discrimination norms at 
international and regional (and, of course, nation) levels over the twentieth century.  It 
is striking that among the limited number of specific UN-sponsored Conventions and 
Declaration following the ICCPR are examples relating to race discrimination (CERD), 
the suppression of apartheid (International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973)), gender discrimination (Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) (CEDAW), and 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief (Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981)).  
These documents tend to associate the suppression of speech which advocates 
discrimination with the realization of the goal of equality[…] 
For all of these reasons, extreme speech (which so often emerges from those on the 
political far right) has been seen as alien, and to some extent antithetical, to the 
concerns of the international 
human rights movement.  In light of this, it is perhaps unsurprising that in no case 
concerning restrictions imposed on speech has the HRC (Human  Rights Committee in 
charge of overseeing the application of the ICCPR) found in favour of a speaker 
associated with the extreme right.44  
The trend in the international community to limit extreme speech is so strong that some 
argue that it could be considered that such limitations are a part of customary 
international law. 
On the basis of these and other developments, (referring to international agreements) it 
is now strongly arguable that the protection against (at least) racial discrimination is an 
obligation erga omnes, that is binding on all states and having the status of a 
peremptory norm. The ECHR has held that discrimination on the grounds of race may 
constitute a breach of the prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment (Cyprus v. 
Turkey (2002) 35 EHRR 731).45  
 
The international community has adopted a view that freedom of expression also carries 
with it positive duties on people46.  These duties include not perpetuating racist or other 
bigoted ideas.  While this has not met with stiff opposition from most of the world, 
there are however some states that find such a positive obligation on individual speech 
to be detrimental to legitimate freedom of speech.  With a number of notable states still 
                                               
44 Hare, Ivan, “Extreme Speech Under International and Regional Human Rights Standards”  found in, 
Extreme Speech and Democracy (2009) p.76 
45 ibid., p.76 and footnote 67 
46 See above quote from UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Concluding 
observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United States of America’ 
14/08/2001. A/56/18,para. 391 
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making reservations with respect to such limitations on speech, an argument can be 
made that prohibition of hate speech has not risen to the level of erga omnes.  The 
point, however, that needs to be taken from this is that the international agreements 
either support or obligate member states to adopt legislation making extreme speech 
illegal.  
 
3.4  Holocaust denial and hate speech provisions in the ECHR 
The European Court of Human Rights, while not directly outlawing Holocaust denial, 
has ruled on several occasions that, hate speech and Holocaust denial do not fall under 
its protection.  Rights to freedom of speech are granted under article 10 of the ECHR 
which states: 
                            Article 10 – Freedom of expression  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, 
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.47 
The ECHR has gone on to further define the protections of article 10.  
 
The Court's supervisory functions oblige it to pay the utmost attention to the principles 
characterising a "democratic society". Freedom of expression constitutes one of the 
essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and 
for the development of every man.  Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2), it is 
applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded 
as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or 
disturb the State or any sector of the population.  Such are the demands of that 
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic 
society".  This means, amongst other things, that every "formality", "condition", 
"restriction" or "penalty" imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued.48  
  
The ECHR however has granted a great amount of leeway to states to determine the 
appropriate limitations on freedom of speech: 
                                               
47 ECHR, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome 1950 
48 Case of Handyside v. The United Kingdom (Application no. 5493/72), ECHR Strasbourg, 7 December 
1976. Para. 49 
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The Court points out that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is 
subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights[…]  The Convention 
leaves to each Contracting State, in the first place, the task of securing the rights and 
liberties it enshrines.   
  
These observations apply, notably, to Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2).  In particular, it is 
not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a uniform 
European conception of morals. The view taken by their respective laws of the 
requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to place, especially in 
our era which is characterized by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of opinions on the 
subject.  By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their 
countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international 
judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the 
"necessity" of a "restriction" or "penalty" intended to meet them. 
  
Consequently, Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) leaves to the Contracting  States a margin 
of appreciation.  This margin is given both to the domestic legislator ("prescribed by 
law") and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called upon to interpret and 
apply the laws 
in force…49 
  
This deference to the states greatly limits the protection for speech under the ECHR, 
since it gives a great deal of control to the states that are signatories.  The ECHR has 
further weakened these rights of freedom of speech contained in the ECHR by 
incorporating the provisions of Article 17 when dealing with freedom of expression.  
Article 17 states:                             
Article 17 - abuse of rights 
Article 17 provides that no one may use the rights guaranteed by the Convention to 
seek the abolition or limitation of rights guaranteed in the Convention. This addresses 
instances where states seek to restrict a human right in the name of another human 
right, or where individuals rely on a human right to undermine other human rights (for 
example where an individual issues a death threat).50 
  
This has removed certain classes of speech from any protection under the ECHR. 
  
3.5 Holocaust denial and hate speech provisions of the Council of Europe  
Convention on Cybercrime 
The internet has caused changes in the area in Holocaust denial and hate speech laws, 
since it has made it easier for people to disseminate information, as well as allowing 
people access to material, denying the Holocaust in countries where such material is 
prohibited.  The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime has tried to deal with 
this new medium by requiring states to adopt legislation outlawing the use of the 
                                               
49 ibid. para. 48 
50 ECHR Art. 17 
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internet to propagate Holocaust denial.  This was done in the Additional Protocol to the 
Convention, which created a uniform prohibition throughout Europe and sought to 
block dissemination of material denying the Holocaust on the internet, at least within 
Europe.51  This optional protocol to the Convention has been signed and ratified by 6 
states inside the Council of Europe.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
51 Additional Protocol to the Convention on cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist 
and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 28 
January 2003, available at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/html/189.htm> (accessed on 
April 13, 2010). 
52 ibid. 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=189&CM=8&DF=17/02/2006&CL=EN
G> (accessed on April 13, 2010). 
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4 Chapter 4: Court decisions regarding Holocaust denial and hate 
speech 
This chapter discusses the decisions by various national courts and international bodies 
relating to Holocaust denial and hate speech. 
4.1  Holocaust denial and hate speech decisions under the ICCPR 
The UN Human Rights Committee which monitors the ICCPR has been unsympathetic 
to protecting speech regarding Holocaust denial.  While the ICCPR affords different 
protections to people than does the ECHR, both have limited protection of speech.  
In the case of Faurisson v. France53, the Court demonstrates the parameters of Article 
19 and its relation to Holocaust denial: 
The restriction on the author's freedom of expression was indeed provided by law i.e. 
the Act of 13 July 1990. It is the constant jurisprudence of the Committee that the 
restrictive law itself must be in compliance with the provisions of the Covenant. In this 
regard the Committee concludes, on the basis of the reading of the judgment of the 17th 
Chambre correctionnelle du Tribunal de grande instance de Paris that the finding of the 
author's guilt was based on his following two statements: "... I have excellent reasons 
not to believe in the policy of extermination of Jews or in the magic gas chambers ... I 
wish to see that 100 per cent of the French citizens realize that the myth of the gas 
chambers is a dishonest fabrication". His conviction therefore did not encroach upon 
his right to hold and express an opinion in general, rather the court convicted Mr. 
Faurisson for having violated the rights and reputation of others. For these reasons the 
Committee is satisfied that the Gayssot Act, as read, interpreted and applied to the 
author's case by the French courts, is in compliance with the provisions of the 
Covenant. 
To assess whether the restrictions placed on the author's freedom of expression by his 
criminal conviction were applied for the purposes provided for by the Covenant, the 
Committee begins by noting, as it did in its General Comment 10 that the rights for the 
protection of which restrictions on the freedom of expression are permitted by article 
19, paragraph 3, may relate to the interests of other persons or to those of the 
community as a whole. Since the statements made by the author, read in their full 
context, were of a nature as to raise or strengthen anti-semitic feelings, the restriction 
served the respect of the Jewish community to live free from fear of an atmosphere of 
anti-semitism. The Committee therefore concludes that the restriction of the author's 
freedom of expression was permissible under article 19, paragraph 3 (a), of the 
Covenant. 
Lastly the Committee needs to consider whether the restriction of the author's freedom 
of expression was necessary. The Committee noted the State party's argument 
contending that the introduction of the Gayssot Act was intended to serve the struggle 
against racism and anti-semitism. It also noted the statement of a member of the French 
Government, the then Minister of Justice, which characterized the denial of the 
existence of the Holocaust as the principal vehicle for anti-semitism. In the absence in 
the material before it of any argument undermining the validity of the State party's 
position as to the necessity of the restriction, the Committee is satisfied that the 
                                               
53 Robert Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993 , U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993(1996) 
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restriction of Mr. Faurisson's freedom of expression was necessary within the meaning 
of article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.54 
As mentioned above, the HRC has never sided with a defendant who advocated right 
wing ideas.  This has essentially created no international system of protection for people 
advocating views that fall outside standard political views, at least on the right. 
 
4.2  Holocaust denial and hate speech decisions under the ECHR 
Freedom of expression is protected under Article 10(1) of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.   This Article, which includes 
exceptions relating to licensing of broadcasting, epitomizes the European conception of 
freedom of expression.  Article 10(2) provides that the exercise of these freedoms may 
be subject to conditions and restrictions that are necessary in a democratic society.  The 
interaction of these two articles has been previously discussed.  Article 10 has been said 
to apply “not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favorably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb 
the State or any sector of the population.”55  However, the protection for views that 
shock or disturb, which is really the essence of freedom of speech, is particularly weak 
under the Convention because of the “margin of appreciation” granted to member 
nations to decide, in the first instance, what best suits their societies. 
The margin of appreciation… has attracted a great deal of justified criticism for its lack 
of precision as a legal concept.  These criticisms apply equally to free speech doctrine, 
but the application of the doctrine in Article 10 cases has been particularly generous 
where states are seeking to suppress extreme speech.  The flexibility of the concept of 
the ‘rights of others’ in Article 10(2) and the refusal of the ECtHR to exclude, for 
example, offence which may be caused to others permit the Court to limit speech in 
cases where the Court is unsympathetic to the motives of the speaker.56 
The already weak level of protection provided by Article 10 as applied with deference 
to national interests, has further been undermined by the Court’s use of Article 17 to 
carve out large exceptions to the application of Article 10.  The case of Norwood v. 
United Kingdom,57 is illustrative of the ECHR’s use of Article 17. 
                                               
54 ibid. 
55 Oberschlick v. Austria, 11662/85 (1991) ECHR 
56 Ivan, op. cit.  p. 78 
57 Norwood v. the United Kingdom no. 23131/03, 16 November 2004                                     
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Norwood was tried and convicted under the British law making it illegal to intentionally 
display any sign that is threatening, abusive or insulting within the sight of a person 
likely to be caused distress, if he intends, or is aware that it may be threatening, abusive 
or insulting.58  He appealed to the ECHR, which rejected his appeal on the ground that 
it fell within Article 17. 
The ECtHR declared Mr. Norwood’s application under Article 10 to be inadmissible on 
the basis that the images he had displayed were a public attack on all Muslims in the 
United Kingdom and fell within Article 17: 
Such a general, vehement attack against a religious group, linking the group as 
a whole with a grave act of terrorism, is incompatible with the values 
proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention, notably tolerance, social peace 
and non-discrimination. 
The use made of Article 17 also demonstrates how little scope there is for reliance on 
Convention arguments when dealing with extreme speech.  Several regrettable results 
flow from this.  First, the ECtHR’s reliance on Article 17 is incompatible with the 
Court’s oft-repeated statements that Article 10 applies not only to speech which is 
favourably received, but also to that which offends, shocks, or disturbs the state or any 
sector of the population.  Secondly, the broad interpretation of Article 17 has the effect 
of excluding the speech in question from the protection of Article 10 altogether.  This is 
particularly dangerous since it removes the need for the state to justify the interference 
with Convention rights and drastically reduces the Court’s role in ensuring that any 
limitations are narrowly construed and convincingly established.  Thirdly, the decision 
is contrary to earlier statements from the European Commission on Human Rights to 
the effect that Article 17 is strictly confined to those situations which threaten the 
democratic system of the state itself and even then is limited to the extent that the 
restriction is proportionate to the seriousness and duration of the threat.59 
In the case of Lehideux and Isorni v. France60, the ECHR stated that Article 17 has  
placed Holocaust denial outside the protection of Article 10; 
 
 [T]here are limits to freedom of expression: the justification of a pro-Nazi policy 
cannot enjoy the protection of Article 10 and the denial of clearly established historical 
facts—such as the Holocaust—are removed by Article 17 from the protection of Article 
10.  As regards the applicatn’s convictions for denying crimes against humanity, the 
Court refers to Article 17: in his book the applicant calls in question the reality, degree 
and gravity of historical facts relating to the Second World War which are clearly 
established, such as the persecution of Jews by the Nazi regime, the Holocaust and he 
Nuremberg trials.  Denying crimes against humanity is one of the most acute forms of 
racial defamation towards the Jews and of incitement to hatred of them.61              
               
                                               
58 Norwood v. DPP, [2003] EHC 1564 (Admin.)  
59 Ivan; op. cit. p. 78 
60 Lehideux and Isorni v. France (case no. 55/1997/839/1045, application no. 24662/94) ECHR 
61 Information Note No. 54 on the Case law of the Court, European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 
June 2003 
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The broad interpretation of Article 17 has so limited the protections provided by Article 
10 that one must wonder if the Convention still protects any statements that “offend, 
shock or disturb.”62  Certainly no such speech that falls into the following categories is 
protected: 
In order that Article 17 may be applied, the aim of the offending actions must be to 
spread violence or hatred, to resort to illegal or undemocratic methods, to encourage the 
use of violence, to undermine the nation’s democratic and pluralist political system, or 
to pursue objectives that are racist or likely to destroy the rights and freedoms of 
others.63  
The Lehideux case, rather than narrowing the provisions of Article 17, interprets it as 
exempting almost any possible kind of offensive political speech from the protections 
of Article 10(1).  It shows that the application of Article 17 is so broad that it almost 
entirely abrogates the protections in Article 10.   
It is hard to think of any controversial political speech which cannot be said to fall 
within one of the categories exempted from protection by Article 17.  For example, it 
could be argued that speech advocating the Platonic system of government would not be 
protected by Article 10, since it falls within Article 17’s proscription of speech 
concerning “undemocratic methods.”  While it is unlikely that one would be prosecuted 
for advocating such a position, as it is not as controversial as the expression of racist or 
far right political views, it merely shows the Court’s ability to dismiss any arguments 
that it finds unsympathetic on the technical ground that Article 17 removes them from 
the protection of Article 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
62 The argument for using Article 17 to exempt speech or conduct from the protections of Article 10 is 
also inherently contradictory.  One cannot take away the rights of others, in response to them 
threatening to take away the rights of others without being guilty of the same infraction that they are 
guilty of. It is the dilemma of tolerance: one must be tolerant of all views even those views that are not 
tolerant of the views of others.  If not, they face inherent self-contradiction.   
63 Lehideux and Isorni v. France (case no. 55/1997/839/1045, application no. 24662/94) ECHR 
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5 Chapter 5: Critique of European Holocaust denial and hate  speech 
laws  
 
This Chapter will critique the deficiencies of European Holocaust denial and hate 
speech laws in the light of jurisprudence from other Western democracies and from a 
philosophical viewpoint. 
 
5.1  No protection is given to false statements 
Some European nations64 and North American nations have come to different 
conclusions on the issue of protecting false statements of fact.  Though there is little 
legal opinion that staunchly supports the protection of false statements, many countries 
do protect them to provide ‘breathing space’ for arguments to be made.  Protection of 
false statements is central to the argument in support of allowing Holocaust denial as a 
form of freedom of expression, as all statements denying the Holocaust, either in scope 
or methods are patently false. 
Countries which have memory laws do not protect the right of people to make false 
statements.  As stated above, Currently fourteen European nations have such memory 
laws in place to criminalize denial of the Holocaust.  The German court ruled directly in 
the case of BGHZ (Entscheigungen des Bundesgerichthofes in Zivilsachen)65 that false 
statements were not protected under the German constitution. 
First of all it is clear that on one can depend on the protection of freedom of expression 
for statements which deny the historical fact of the Jewish murders in the “Third 
Reich.” Even in the confrontation over a question that essentially disquiets the public, 
as is the case here, no one has a protected interest in spreading untrue statements.66 
 
This has been a harder line than other countries have been willing to take. Canada, for 
example, has dealt directly with the issue. In the case R. v Zundel, [1992} 2 S.C.R. 731, 
the defendant was convicted in the trial court of the crime of “spreading false news” 
under section 181 of the Canadian Criminal Code for distributing a booklet that 
“suggested, inter alia, that it had not been established that six million Jews were killed 
before and during world War II and that the Holocaust was a myth perpetrated by a 
                                               
64 Spain’s Constitutional Court has recently ruled that false statements of fact are protected. 
65 BGHZ (Entscheigungen des Bundesgerichthofes in Zivilsachen) 75 (1979) 
66 Kahn, Robert; “Holocaust Denial and the Law: A Comparative Study”, Palgrave MacMullan  (2004) 
P. 18 
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worldwide Jewish conspiracy.”67   On appeal, the Canadian Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction on the ground that this prohibition of spreading false news was incompatible 
with the protections for freedom of speech contained in section 2(b) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: 
Section 181 of the Code infringes the guarantee of freedom of expression.  Section 2(b) 
of the Charter protects the right of a minority to express its view, however unpopular it 
may be.  All communications which convey or attempt to convey meaning are 
protected by s. 2(b), unless the physical form by which the communication is made (for 
example, a violent act) excludes protection.  The content of the communication is 
irrelevant.  The purpose of the guarantee is to permit free expression to the end of 
promoting truth, political or social participation, and selffulfillment.  That purpose 
extends to the protection of minority beliefs which the majority regards as wrong or 
false.  Section 181, which may subject a person to criminal conviction and potential 
imprisonment because of words he published, has undeniably the effect of restricting 
freedom of expression and, therefore, imposes a limit on s. 2(b). 
Given the broad, purposive interpretation of the freedom of expression guaranteed by 
s. 2(b), those who deliberately publish falsehoods are not, for that reason alone, 
precluded from claiming the benefit of the constitutional guarantees of free speech.  
Before a person is denied the protection of s. 2(b), it must be certain that there can be 
no justification for offering protection.  The criterion of falsity falls short of this 
certainty, given that false statements can sometimes have value and given the difficulty 
of conclusively determining total falsity.68  
 
The US Supreme Court stated the US position on the dissemination of both false ideas 
and false opinions in the public arena in Gertz v. Welch, 418 US 323 (1974).69  The 
Court stated:  
We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment, there is no such thing 
as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction 
not on the conscience of judges and juries, but on the competition of other ideas. But 
there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor 
the careless error materially advances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust and 
wide-open" debate on public issues. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. 
They belong to that category of utterances which are no essential part of any exposition 
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is 
nevertheless inevitable in free debate. As James Madison pointed out in the Report on 
the Virginia Resolutions of 1798: "Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper 
use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press." 4 J. 
Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution of 1787, p. 571 (1876). And punishment of 
error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally 
guaranteed freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize that a rule of strict 
liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual 
                                               
67 R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 August 27, 1992 
68 ibid. 
69 The quoted statement pertains to speech in the public arena which is made without intentional 
malice. False statements made about private individuals who are not public officials or public figures 
may subject the speaker to civil liability for damages. 
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assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Allowing the media to avoid liability 
only by proving the truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate 
protection to First Amendment liberties. As the Court stated in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, supra, at 279: Allowance of the defense of truth, [p341] with the burden of 
proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. The 
First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech 
that matters.70 
 
In its earlier decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964), the US 
Supreme Court had found that false statements themselves can be thought to be 
protected and valuable in at least some circumstances:   
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual 
assertions--and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount--leads 
to a comparable "self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden 
of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. 
[note 19] Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized 
the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual 
particulars. [...] Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred 
from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is, 
in fact, true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense 
of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the 
unlawful zone." Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S. at 526. The rule thus dampens the 
vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.71 
 
This case has been interpreted by James Weinstein to give greater protection of freedom 
of speech with regards to untrue statements.  
The Supreme Court has sent mixed signals about whether false statements of fact in 
public discourse are inherently valuable or are protected only for pragmatic reasons 
such as creating ‘breathing space’ for true factual statements.  But whatever the reason, 
modern First Amendment doctrine has extended considerable protection to the false 
factual statements in public discourse.  Thus for a mixture of theoretical and practical 
reasons, the Court would probably find that the most salient harm caused by Holocaust 
denial that government can legitimately address—the infliction of psychic injury on 
Holocaust survivors and their families—is not weighty enough to justify the 
suppression of even false statements within public discourse.72 (Extreme speech P. 90) 
 
 In New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, the US Supreme Court used a statement by John 
Stuart Mill to justify these protections:  “Even a false statement may be deemed to make 
a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about "the clearer perception 
and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error"73.   
This line of reasoning was followed by the Spanish Constitutional Court in their recent 
decision to overturn a law outlawing Holocaust denial as being unconstitutional.   
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It is appropriate to point out that the mere dissemination of conclusions in respect of the 
existence or non existence of specific facts, without issuing value judgments on these or 
their unlawful nature, affects the scope of scientific freedom acknowledged in section 
b) of art. 20.1 CE. As we declared in JCC 43/2004, of 23 March, our Constitution 
confers greater protection to scientific freedom than to freedom of expression and 
information, the ultimate purpose being based on the fact that "only in this way is 
historical research possible, which is always, by definition, controversial and debatable, 
as it arises on the basis of statements and value judgments the objective truth of which 
it is impossible to claim with absolute certainty, with this uncertainty consubstantial to 
the historical debate representing what is its most valuable asset, to be respected and 
meriting protection due to the essential role it plays in forming an historical awareness 
adapted to the dignity of citizens of a free and democratic society”.74  
 
So courts throughout the North America and in Spain have interpreted freedom of 
expression to protect factually untrue statements in some circumstances. 
As pointed out by various courts there is a great deal of jurisprudence documenting the 
potential benefits of even factually false statements.  The Canadian court in its 
reasoning in Zundel, supra, dealt with whether deliberate lies could be valuable to 
society.  
The first difficulty results from the premise that deliberate lies can never have value.  
Exaggeration -- even clear falsification -- may arguably serve useful social purposes 
linked to the values underlying freedom of expression.  A person fighting cruelty 
against animals may knowingly cite false statistics in pursuit of his or her beliefs and 
with the purpose of communicating a more fundamental message, e.g., `cruelty to 
animals is increasing and must be stopped'.  A doctor, in order to persuade people to be 
inoculated against a burgeoning epidemic, may exaggerate the number or geographical 
location of persons potentially infected with the virus.  An artist, for artistic purposes, 
may make a statement that a particular society considers both an assertion of fact and a 
manifestly deliberate lie; consider the case of Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses, viewed 
by many Muslim societies as perpetrating deliberate lies against the Prophet. 
All of this expression arguably has intrinsic value in fostering political participation and 
individual self-fulfillment.  To accept the proposition that deliberate lies can never fall 
under s. 2(b) would be to exclude statements such as the examples above from the 
possibility of constitutional protection.  I cannot accept that such was the intention of 
the framers of the Constitution.75 76 
 
The scenarios described in the above quotation are clearly more palatable than denying 
the Holocaust,77 but equal application of the law would have to mean that if freedom of 
expression where not extended to false statements, these statements would as well be 
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deemed unprotected speech, and people who found harm from such statements78 could 
seek redress from the courts.  Not giving ‘breathing space’ to individuals, and even 
putting them in peril of criminal prosecution does seem to be greatly restrictive on 
individuals since people making statements they believed to be true could rightly fear 
prosecution.  
The argument for not protecting false statements of facts is also undermined by the fact 
that false statements of fact are inherently less dangerous that statements of opinion.  
This is because, a false statement of fact that is so blatantly false that the courts are 
willing to adopt the contrary fact as being the indisputable truth, means that any false 
statement reaching that level of disbelief is easily disproved.  Unlike statements of 
opinion, which have some room for argument, blatantly false statements that are readily 
disprovable should offer very little opposition to the correct belief.  In fact, the most 
basic precepts of democracy rely on individuals at the most minimal level to be able to 
follow logical arguments and make appropriate decisions.  Legislating against the 
expression of false facts seems to be overkill, since it has the danger of freezing out 
legitimate speech in order to prevent something that poses less of a threat than the 
expression of radical opinion, because false facts have the inherent weakness of being 
untrue.  
 
5.2  American market place of ideas v. European balancing approach 
Europe and American have come to represent the two sides of this argument.  
America tends to emphasize the rights of individuals to express their opinions, even 
though they may be considered to be shocking or repulsive by the community, and to 
believe that the government has little right to interfere with or judge those opinions.  On 
the other hand, Europe tends to believe that the rights of individual speakers must be 
balanced against equal or sometimes greater respect for the rights of communities and 
other individuals. While this may only be a matter of the different weight given to 
individual versus community rights, the result may be substantially different. 
American jurisprudence has generally taken the position that the government should not 
interfere with the dissemination of ideas whether true or false or make a judgment as to 
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their validity or utility.   In the specific case of Holocaust denial, America does not have 
the same proximity to the atrocities committed during World War II as Europe 
and, particularly those countries in which they were committed.  However, America as 
a country does have its own checkered past.  America has chosen to deal with that past, 
and groups that might wish to reinvent the past, differently than Europe.  Slavery, 
segregation and blatant racism have long played a troubling role in America. Despite 
this, America has not limited speech regarding racism, or groups, such as the Ku Klux 
Klan, that espouse racist views: 
As is well-known, American First Amendment doctrine protects incitement to racial 
hatred, Holocaust denial, and other forms of hate speech widely criminalised in the rest 
of the world, and explicitly excluded from free expression principles in numerous 
human rights documents.79    
 
The US Supreme Court has considered the permissible limits on hate speech in two 
cases involving cross burnings.  Cross burning has a very sorted place in America’s 
segregationist past since it was used by the Klu Klux Klan to intimidate blacks.  R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), held that the city ordinance was 
unconstitutionally overbroad because it reached protected as well as unprotected 
speech. R.A.V. stands for the proposition that even unprotected speech cannot be 
discriminated against.   
Professor Weinstein states:  
R.A.V teaches two lessons.  The first is that the prohibition against viewpoint 
discrimination is so central to the framework of American free speech doctrine that it 
applies not just to public discourse and other forms of protected speech, but also to 
speech beyond the scope of First Amendment protection.  The second lesson—and the 
one particularly relevant to the question of the constitutionality of hate speech laws—is 
that the basic First Amendment precept that ‘[t]here is an “equality of status in the field 
of ideas”’ extends to the expression of racist ideas, including ‘virulent notions of racial 
supremacy’.  Thus under the First Amendment, The most offensive expression of racist 
ideology is on an equal footing with arguments for or against higher taxes, the legality 
of abortion, or the legitimacy of the war in Iraq.80 
 
In Virginia v. Black, 538 US 343 (2003), found that a Virginia statute against cross 
burning was unconstitutional, but that cross burning done with an attempt to intimidate 
can be limited because such expression has a long and pernicious history as a signal of 
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impending violence.  In reconciling the holding of the two cases, Justice O’Connor 
stated: 
A ban on cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate is fully consistent with 
this Court's holding in R. A. V. Contrary to the Virginia Supreme Court's 
ruling, R. A. V. did not hold that the First Amendment prohibits all forms of content-
based discrimination within a proscribable area of speech. Rather, the Court 
specifically stated that a particular type of content discrimination does not violate the 
First Amendment when the basis for it consists entirely of the very reason its entire 
class of speech is proscribable. 505 U. S., at 388. For example, it is permissible to 
prohibit only that obscenity that is most patently offensive in its prurience--i.e., that 
which involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity. Ibid. Similarly, 
Virginia's statute does not run afoul of the First Amendment insofar as it bans cross 
burning with intent to intimidate. Unlike the statute at issue in R. A. V., the Virginia 
statute does not single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward "one of the 
specified disfavored topics." Id., at 391. It does not matter whether an individual burns 
a cross with intent to intimidate because of the victim's race, gender, or religion, or 
because of the victim's "political affiliation, union membership, or 
homosexuality." Ibid. Thus, just as a State may regulate only that obscenity which is 
the most obscene due to its prurient content, so too may a State choose to prohibit only 
those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm. Pp. 14-
17.81 
 
The US Supreme Court’s limitations on cross burning are narrow and are not meant to 
limit speech not aimed directly at intimidation.  As the Court stated, in holding that 
Virginia’s statute was overbroad: 
It may be true that a cross burning, even at a political rally, arouses a sense of anger or 
hatred among the vast majority of citizens who see a burning cross. But this sense of 
anger or hatred is not sufficient to ban all cross burnings. As Gerald Gunther has stated, 
“The lesson I have drawn from my childhood in Nazi Germany and my happier adult 
life in this country is the need to walk the sometimes difficult path of denouncing the 
bigot’s hateful ideas with all my power, yet at the same time challenging any 
community’s attempt to suppress hateful ideas by force of law.” Casper, Gerry, 55 
Stan. L. Rev. 647, 649 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The prima facie 
evidence provision in this case ignores all of the contextual factors that are necessary to 
decide whether a particular cross burning is intended to intimidate. The First 
Amendment does not permit such a shortcut.82 
 
By contrast Europe has taken a more restrictive view of permissible speech.  A case in 
England demonstrates the difference in outlook.  England, though a common law 
country, generally has lesser protections of speech than the US, though it goes farther to 
protect speech in some areas than much of continental Europe.  The case of Hammond 
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v. DPP, [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin), illustrates how the state does not mind taking 
sides.  In this case Hammond a preacher was protesting against homosexuality.  
The justices ruled that that the statements on his sign, were ‘insulting’ and ‘caused 
distress to persons who were present’.  In their view ‘there was a pressing social need’ 
for the restriction on Hammond’s expression because Hammond’s message implied that 
the gay and lesbian communities were immoral and because ‘there is a need to show 
tolerance towards all sections of society’.83 
The balancing between rights in Europe can further be seen in the judgment of the 
Spanish Constitutional court.  
[N]either ideological freedom (art. 16 SC) nor freedom of expression (art.20.1 SC) 
includes the right to makes statements, expressions or campaigns of a racist or 
xenophobic nature, since as art. 20.4 states, there are no unlimited rights and this is 
contrary, not only to the right to honour of the person or persons directly affected, but 
to other constitutional rights, such as that of human dignity (art. 10 SC), which both 
public authorities and citizens themselves are required to respect in accordance with the 
terms of arts. 9 and 10 of the Constitution. Dignity as a rank of category of the person 
as such from which the right to honour derives and is promulgated (art. 18.1 SC.), does 
not admit any discrimination on grounds of birth, race or sex, opinions or beliefs. 
Hatred and disrespect of a whole people or ethnic group (of any people or any ethnic 
group) are incompatible with respect for human dignity, which can only be fulfilled it is 
attributed equally to all mankind, to all ethnic groups and people. Therefore, the right to 
honour of members of a people or ethnic group in so far as it protects and expresses the 
feeling of dignity itself,  is unquestionably infringed when a whole people or race are 
generically offended and derided, irrespective of who they are. Thus the expressions 
and claims made by the respondent also ignore the effective validity of the higher 
values of the system, specifically that of the value of equality contained in art.1.1 de la 
Constitution, in relation to art. 14 of the same, and so they cannot be considered to be 
constitutionally legitimate. In this respect, and even when, as has been reiterated, the 
constitutional requirement of objective veracity does not operate as a restriction to the 
scope of ideological freedoms and freedom of expression, such rights do not in any 
case, guarantee the right to express and disseminate a specific comprehension of history 
or perception of the world with the deliberate intention, in doing so of despising and 
discriminating persons or groups of people on the basis of any personal, ethnic or social 
condition or circumstance, as this would be tantamount to admitting that due to the 
mere fact of making an argument in a more or less historical discourse, the Constitution 
permits the violation of one of the higher values of the legal system, namely equality 
(art. 1.1 S.C.) and one of the foundations of the political order and of social peace, that 
is, the dignity of persons (art. 10.1 SC.)84  
This reasoning clearly shows a different view from the American First Amendment 
protections.   
Interestingly, in this case, the Spanish Constitutional Court  held while a law making it 
illegal to deny the Holocaust was unconstitutional, it could be illegal for a person to 
justify the Holocaust, showing that the court extended greater protection to false 
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statements (denial of the Holocaust) than it did to opinions (that justified the 
Holocaust): 
[I]t is constitutionally legitimate to punish as crimes conduct which, even when it is not 
clearly seen to be directly inciting the perpetration of crimes against the rights of 
peoples, such as genocide, it does presuppose an indirect incitement to do so, or 
provokes in some way discrimination, hatred or violence, which is precisely what in 
constitutional terms is permitted by the establishing the category of public justification 
of genocide (art. 607.2 PC). This comprehension of public justification of genocide, 
always with the customary caution for respect regarding the content of ideological 
freedom, in that includes the proclamation of personal ideas or political stance, or 
adherence to those of others, permits the proportional penal intervention of the State as 
the ultimate solution for defending protected public fundamental rights and freedoms, 
whose direct affectation excludes conduct justifying genocide from the scope of 
protection of the fundament right to freedom of expression (art. 20.1SC) so that, 
interpreted in this sense, the punitive regulation does, on this point, conform to the 
Constitution.85  
It is arguable that opinions expressing extreme views represent a greater danger for 
societies than false statements, since there is no way to absolutely disprove the validity 
of an opinion.  Facts can be disproven, though there is often enough looseness of play in 
facts as well to create at least some question of truth, but opinions can often be purely 
subjective.  This means that a state in regulating speech needs to make subjective claims 
on truth.  This of course is extremely problematic for people who constitute the 
minority in a society.  Since the majority can dictate the norms accepted within a 
society, those ideas that fall outside of those norms can be subjected to prosecution 
based on ideas that might be legitimate.  
The aforementioned English case of Hammond v. DPP, supra, shows the dangers of 
such subjective regulation of ideas. Not only does this case demonstrate the limitations 
and the deference that will be paid to the larger community when weighing the worth of 
speech, it also illustrates some of the evils that not protecting speakers’ rights can have.  
While Hammond merely expressed his views on a socially relevant issue, he was 
assaulted by the crowd, arrested, tried and convicted. 
His core speech right was first violated by the failure of the police to protect him from 
physical assault, then compounded by his arrest, trial and, conviction for doing no more 
than expressing, in fairly innocuous terms, a dissenting view about the ‘organization 
and culture of society’.  There can be no denying Hammond’s speech was on a matter 
of public concern.  The morality of homosexual activity is a topic that has obvious 
relevance to current social policy matters… Nor can there be any doubt that Hammond 
was expressing his views in a setting dedicated to public discourse—the pedestrian area 
of a town square where speakers evidently are free to express their views on issues of 
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the day.  It would appear, then, that Hammond’s speech lies at the heart of the 
expression that must be allowed in any free and democratic society.86  
This case87 shows that opinion that is merely unpopular can be silenced.   
Allowing a state to place a monopoly on truth creates problems with people whose 
views do not fall within that bracket.  Clearly like in the Hammond case, many people 
might believe homosexuality to be wrong, as it is often a tenet of many religions.  
While racism and bigotry are almost universally thought of as false, the state still cannot 
claim to have absolute certainty about this issue.  
US Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote about the issues involved in the 
government regulating opinion and defending the rigidity of First Amendment 
protections, as follows: 
But though our rule has flaws, it has substantial merit as well.  It is a rule, in an area 
where fairly precise rules are better than more discretionary and more subjective 
balancing tests.  On a theoretical level, it reflects important insights into the meaning of 
the free speech principle—for instance, that content-based speech restrictions are 
especially likely to be improper attempts to value some forms of speech over others, or 
are particularly susceptible to being used by the government to distort public debate[…]  
On a practical level, it has in application generally led to seemingly sensible results.  
And, perhaps most importantly, no better alternative has yet come to light88 
The idea of balancing an individual’s right to speak versus the needs of the community 
always has the profound flaw of subjectivity.  It is almost impossible to create a clear 
and uniform standard between permitted speech and prohibited speech.  This ambiguity 
hurts all members of democracies in that it will cause even permitted speech to be 
silenced because of fear of prosecution.  One of the fundamental requirements of 
legislation is that it clearly state what is permitted and what is proscribed, so that one 
may adjust his conduct accordingly.  Legislation prohibiting certain types of speech 
often are defective in this regard.    
5.3 Memory laws constitute legislated orthodoxy 
Holocaust denial and hate speech laws constitute legislated orthodoxy:  they state that 
one view is permitted and the other is not allowed. Such legislation forces an individual 
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to accept the orthodox position decreed by the state and prohibits him from expressing 
his own contrary opinion. Such a position is anathema to a democracy. 
 
The US Supreme Court took up the issue of legislated orthodoxy in the cases of West 
Virginian State Board of Education by Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) and Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).  Both cases involved Jehovah’s Witnesses, but were 
decided on the basis of freedom of speech, not freedom of religion.  Barnette held that a 
state statute that required children in public school to participate in saying the Pledge of 
Allegiance to the flag of the United States or face the threat of expulsion from school 
was unconstitutional.  In Wooley, the Supreme Court reversed the misdemeanor 
conviction of a man for covering up the state slogan “Live free or die” on his 
automobile license plate.  In both cases, the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot 
“coerce uniformity of sentiment” and went on to state in Wooley: 
 
Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as 
part of his daily life - indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view - to be 
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds 
unacceptable. In doing so, the State "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is 
the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official 
control."89 
 
Memory laws that criminalize the expression of dissenting views raise many serious 
questions, both legal and ethical about the role of society, which make their application 
difficult.  
 
[T]he criminal offense of negationism raises the question of the relationship between 
ethical-social and legal-criminal norms and the need to distinguish the border between 
ethics and law.  This risk appears to take place precisely in those situation where, 
among the ensemble of  infinite interpretations of historical facts (and of historical 
schools), the state elevates one interpretation to the level of criminal protection, and 
consequently promotes it as the one official, unique interpretation.  Therefore, the 
assessment of the trial judge rests not so much on the reconstruction of the facts but 
rather on the interpretation of those facts.  What is judged, in other words, is the denial, 
minimization, or justification of those events.  Even when an interpretation is generally 
accepted, the criminal law should not protect that interpretation, nor should it punish 
assertions that question it.  In such a situation, the law essentially protects an 
ideology.90 
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Subjugating individual beliefs to the beliefs of the community to this extent runs the 
danger of creating an oppressive society as bad as that which it attempts to guard 
against.   Ian Cram in his book “Contested Words”, quotes Burt Neuborne, to the effect 
that coerced communities  
 
… use force to impose a false façade of unity, a process that has very often resulted in 
procrustean abuse and tyranny, without materially advancing the values of caring and 
humanity that make true community worth striving for.91 
 
One need not look far for this in history.  Contemporaneously, France is engaged in a 
debate over the use of religious dress and is contemplating a complete ban of the 
niqab92, which has clear implications for the rights of individuals versus the rights of the 
community. 
Censorship based upon the claim of the good of the community often leads to abuses of 
its own in denying legitimate individual rights.  It is improper to merely look at the 
atrocities committed by the Nazis and ignore the atrocities which have been committed 
by other groups by the imposition of communitarian beliefs upon individuals (e.g., the 
Inquisition and forced assimilation of minority groups). Any coerced imposition of a 
society’s ideas, whether it be Holocaust denial or restrictions on ethnic or religious 
groups sets a dangerous precedent that may lead to further limitations that threaten 
democracy itself.  History has shown that trust in the good intentions of the leaders of 
government is often misplaced. 
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6 Chapter 6: Problems in applying the balancing approach 
   
The application of the balancing approach has many problems that are not present in the 
American rigid, bright line approach of protecting individual expression of opinion. 
 
6.1  Inconsistent court decisions 
The balancing approach adopted generally in Europe has a fundamental weakness, 
compared with the market place of ideas that the United States uses, in that it is almost 
impossible to have consistent court rulings when it comes to such a nuanced approach.  
This balancing approach is especially difficult to apply in changing times, and is 
especially ill-suited for Europe, which is dealing with the problem of assimilating new 
and heterogeneous minority groups at this time.  This is evident when one contrasts the 
treatment of the Danish cartoons (though the cartoons were reprinted in so many 
different countries that it became a pan European problem) with the treatment of films 
which offended Christian sensibilities.   
The ECHR upheld two cases of blasphemy in the 1990s, both of which involved 
banning films that could be considered offensive to Christians, Otto Preminger Institut 
v. Austria93 and Wingrove v. UK94.  While these blasphemy laws were used to protect 
Christian sensibilities, they were not applied to protect Muslims offended by the Danish 
cartoons.  When these cartoons were republished in France, Muslim organizations 
called without success for them to be banned. 
The court (French Court) concluded that: 
Although the character of the caricature may be shocking, even insulting, to 
Muslim sensitivities, the context and the circumstances of its population in the 
paper Charlie Hebdo arose independently of any deliberate intention to directly 
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and gratuitously offend people of the Muslim faith; that the acceptable limits of 
freedom of expression have not, therefore, been exceeded. 95 
After the Danish cartoon scandal, there has been a general move to end blasphemy 
laws. While some European states have liberalized laws against blasphemy, they have 
not liberalized laws dealing with hatred. The blasphemy cases and the Danish cartoon 
case illustrate some of the problems inherent in applying laws restricting free speech.  
There is the danger that the courts will make arbitrary distinctions in applying the laws 
to protect some favored groups while subjecting other groups to abuse. There is only an 
arbitrary distinction between hatred and blasphemy; in fact the lines can be so blurred 
that there can be little distinction between the two.  Now, with the changing 
demographics of Europe as a result of the inflow of immigrants, religion has gone 
beyond merely characterizing belief systems and started to define peoples. 
While it can reasonably be argued that allowing Holocaust denial as speech does not 
serve any public good other than bringing issues to the forefront, the same can be said 
in the Danish cartoon case.  The Danish cartoons depicted, among other things, 
Mohammad with a turban on his head resembling a bomb. This was not only offensive 
to Muslims because of the association of Mohammad with violence, but the very act of 
drawing Mohammad was offensive.  It cannot be argued that this was a nuanced 
criticism of Islam, with the legitimate purpose of fostering genuine debate.  Even though 
these images were clearly offensive to Muslims, the response to them was not at all like 
the response to Holocaust denial.  While the images were universally renounced, the 
concept of freedom of expression was lauded and their publication was argued to be a 
necessary part of a free press.   
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The Muslim community attempted, without success to have blasphemy laws used 
against the people involved.  One Muslim group pointed to an obvious double 
standard: if they had chosen to depict Judaism and Jews in a derogatory light that would 
be illegal activity in certain countries, while these cartoons, which held Islam and its 
adherents up to scorn and ridicule were not illegal. Denmark which has no law against 
Holocaust denial refused to print cartoons denying the Holocaust, while a smaller paper 
in Denmark did, but only depicting less offensive images submitted.  This double 
standard violates one of the basic tenets of equality before the law.  Given the fact that 
judges are usually members of the dominant groups in society, it is difficult for courts 
to apply the law in an even-handed manner. 
 
6.2  Lack of clear and objective standards 
The balancing approach has the inherent problem of subjectivity.  Any time a court is 
required to balance competing interests, it must assign weights to various factors and 
the weights assigned are almost always based upon subjective criteria.   The problem 
with not establishing clear and objective standards for people to follow is illustrated by 
the following quote:  
As an example from recent years dealing with religious abuse and defamation, we 
may cite the criminal proceedings taken against the writer Michel Houellebecq 
for the following remarks taken from an interview granted by the latter to a 
literary magazine: ‘[A]fter all, the stupidest religion is Islam.  When you read the 
Koran you’re appalled (…) appalled’.  The writer was nevertheless acquitted. 
The Giniewski case is no less remarkable in terms of the difficulty of the task 
faced by the judiciary.  This case concerned an article published in a journal in 
1994 that was very critical towards Pope John-Paul II’s encyclical The Splendour 
of the Truth (Veritatis Splendor, 1993).  The author of the article, Paul Giniewski, 
a writer, historian, and theologian, was prosecuted for religious defamation 
damaging to Catholics because of certain passages in his, article, and in 
particular, the following: 
The Catholic Church institutes itself as the sole guardian of divine truth… 
It loudly proclaims the fulfilment of the Old Covenant in the New, the 
superiority of the latter… Many Christians have recognized that scriptural 
anti-Judaism and the doctrine of “fulfilment” of the Old Covenant in the 
New led to anti-Semitism and prepared the ground in which the idea of 
implementation of Auschwitz took seed. 
Giniewski was initially convicted for the article.  His conviction was later 
annulled before a court of appeal, the ruling of which then annulled by the Court 
of Cassation.  A new court of appeal was charged with judging the case and 
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convicted the author for religious defamation.  The case was brought before the 
ECtHR, who concluded that France’s conviction of Giniewski constituted a 
violation of freedom of expression.96 
While the ECtHR overturned his conviction, the evidence of religious sympathies can 
clearly be seen, as Ginewski was convicted by national courts for using fairly benign 
language.   
French law continues to demonstrate one of the weaknesses in the balancing approach, 
because the great judicial discretion involved leads to unequal outcomes. 
 
French criminal law theoretically accords all religions with the same protection 
against abuse or defamation.  This equality is not, however, confirmed in reality, 
in that the majority of trials (and therefore the majority of convictions) concern 
speech directed towards Christianity (and almost exclusively towards 
Catholicism) and Islam. Many explanations exist for this situation:… the fact that 
judges apprehend speech directed towards Jews under the category of racial, 
rather than religious, abuse and defamation (denigrating public speeches directed 
towards Judaism as a doctrinal corpus are virtually non-existent in France)97 
This characterization has lead to its own problems: 
The Dieudonné case also deserves mention as an illustration of the random nature 
of trials for racial abuse defamation. ‘Black’ (or rather mixed-race) professional 
comedian and political activist Dieudonné M’Bala had given an interview with a 
Lyons newspaper during the 2002 presidential elections in which he wished to be 
a candidate.  To the question ‘[W]hat do you think of the rising anti-Semitism 
amongst young ‘beurs’ (North-Africans born in France)?’ he replied: 
Racism was invented by Abraham. ‘The Chosen People’, that’s the beginning of 
racism.  Muslims today are retaliating tit for tat.  For me, Jews and Muslims, it 
doesn’t exist.  So anti-Semitism doesn’t exist, because Jews don’t exist.  These 
two notions are just as stupid as each other.  No one is Jewish or else everyone 
is.  I don’t understand any of it.  In my opinion, Jewish, it’s a sect, a scam.  It’s 
one of the most serious ones because it was the first.  Some Muslims take the 
same route by reviving concepts like ‘the Holy War’… 
The court of appeal acquitted Dieudonné by stating that ‘returned to their original 
context, the terms “Jewish, it’s a sect, a scam” is rooted in a theoretical debate on 
the influence of religions and does not constitute an attack on the Jewish 
community as human community’.  For its part, the Court of Cassation (bearing 
in mind that it does not cite the activist in the same way) argued that ‘the 
affirmation “Jewish, it’s a sect, a scam” It’s one of the most serious ones because 
it was the first.” Is not grounded in the free criticism of a religious fact 
contributing to a debate of general interest, but constitutes abuse that targets a 
group of people on the grounds of it origin.  The suppression of this abuse is 
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97 ibid p. 233 
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therefore a necessary abridgement of freedom of expression in a democratic 
society’.98 
6.3  Difficulty in determining who is guilty 
The case of Jersild v. Denmark99, shows another problem of applying the Holocaust 
laws: how do you decide which participants in the dissemination of prohibited views are 
criminally liable?   Jersild was a journalist who conducted a television interview 
with members of a Neo-Nazi organization, who made derogatory statements about 
immigrants and ethnic groups during the interview.  The interview was edited and 
shown on television. The members of the group making the statements were convicted 
of disseminating racial remarks and the reporter was convicted of aiding and abetting 
the dissemination of such ideas by the national court. The ECHR cleared the reporter of 
disseminating racist views, based on the finding that the report was intended for an 
educated audience and not meant to champion them.  “Thus although the journalist was 
protected in Jersild, the ECtHR was clear that the individual members of the extremist 
group interviewed by him were properly convicted of the dissemination of racist 
insults”.100   
Similarly, Catholic Archbishop Williamson was recently convicted in Germany of 
making remarks denying the Holocaust in a television interview with Swedish 
Television.101 During the interview, Williamson stated that “he did not believe than any 
Jews were killed in gas chambers during World War” and that “he did not believe the 
consensus among historians that six million Jews were killed by the Nazis.”102  The 
interview took place in Germany, but the Archbishop was assured that the interview 
would be broadcast only in Sweden, where such views were legal.  The television 
                                               
98 ibid p. 234 
99 Jersild v. Denmark  (Application no. 15890/89) (1994) ECHR 
100 Hare, Ivan, “Extreme Speech Under International and Regional Human Rights Standards” found in 
Extreme Speech and Democracy (2009)   P. 73 
101 See: Christian Law Journal. “Catholic Bishop Convicted of Holocaust Denial”, 
www.christianlawjournal.com/featured-articles/catholic-bishop-convicted-of-holocaust-denial/ Lasted 
accessed on May 3, 2010. 
102 Citations from interview in ibid. 
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interview was not broadcast in Germany; however, it was available on the internet in 
Germany.  The person making the statements was fined, but the interviewer who 
conducted the interview was not charged with any crime.    
 
6.4  Difficulty in determining what is prohibited Holocaust denial or hate 
 speech 
The changing nature of Holocaust denial has also presented a challenge to the 
courts.  In recent years, Holocaust denial has started to take on the guise of scientific 
debate. With the changing of Holocaust denial, and its pretense to become more 
“pseudo-scientific” it has dropped much of the blatant anti-Semitism and on the face of 
it does not seek to interfere with the rights of anyone.  Attempts to disguise Holocaust 
denial as legitimate historical debate has hampered attempts to prevent it: 
[M]ore subtle and legally aware Holocaust deniers do not generally even identify the 
targets of their ideological politics in a direct fashion.  Instead, they cloak themselves in 
the garb of academic inquiry and the search for historical accuracy and truth.  Their 
underlying, but central, anti-Semitism is generally articulated in vague, coded terms 
understandable and understood by their closed circle of adherents.  Traditional criminal 
law categories, like incitement of conspiracy, are difficult if not impossible to apply in 
such cases.  A legally knowledgeable Holocaust denier has little difficulty in writing of 
‘Zionists’ and ‘Marxists,’ or of ‘survivors’ in scare quotes or in asserting that ‘our 
traditional enemies’ are behind the claims that the Holocaust occurred.  While direct 
semiotic attacks on ‘Jews’ for example will easily and uncontroversially fall afoul of 
most non-American legal regimes aimed at prohibiting racial, religious, and ethnic hate 
speech, more subtle encodings may prove more difficult to regulate.103 
The problem that this gives rise to is demonstrated in the “Auschwitz myth” case104 
where two defendants published a paper called the “Auschwitz-myth”.  In the 
“Auschwitz myth” case (NJW (1995): 1038), German Judge Kob found the defendants 
not guilty for the following reasons:  
Goertz and Siefert accepted the Holocaust as a historical fact and by the term 
“Auschwitz-myth” had not intended to deny the Holocaust.  Kob conceded that some in 
right-wing circles used the phrase to escape punishment for Holocaust denial, but this 
usage did not inhere in the term itself.  The German word Mythos (“myth”) was 
“ambiguous.”  Der Spiegle Had used the term “Auschwitz-myth” without raising 
suspicions.  Given this , Kob was compelled by the principle in dubio pro reo (“in 
doubt for the defense”) to acquit the two defendants. 
                                               
103 Fraser, David; “’On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Nazi’: Some Comparative Legal Aspects of 
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The public debate turned on the plausibility of Kob’s interpretation of “Mythos.”  The 
Süddeutsche Zeitung noted that the Duden foreign-word dictionary listed three 
definitions of the term: “an epic, poem or story handed down from the prehistory of a 
people,” “a glorified person, thing or event, which has a legendary character,” or “a 
fairytale.” Critics expressed disbelief at Kob’s interpretation of Mythos. Ignatz Bubis 
put it bluntly: “They wanted with the word ‘myth’ to express clearly the comparable 
word “lie,” Michael Friedman saw another example of the “inability” of German law 
“to understand the violence which hides just in words.”105 
The changing of Holocaust denial to fit within permitted bounds in the legal framework 
of countries that regulate such speech, undermines the basic argument for outlawing it 
in the first place.  Often the court can be placed in the awkward position of being unable 
to adequately judge whether the speech is prohibited or not.  While the mere difficulty 
of prosecution is not a philosophical reason for allowing such speech, it does go to the 
practical nature of enforcing such laws.  In fact defendants in trials like this can face a 
win, win situation: if they lose they can easily be seen as martyrs for their causes and if 
they are acquitted, they can claim the State tacitly approves their speech.  The cause of 
people being prosecuted often receives more publicity, especially if the people being 
prosecuted claim that they are the victim of a conspiracy, than if they were simply 
ignored. 
It also begs the question that if people are not advocating hurting others or advocating 
the taking of others rights,106 people have the right to collective identity and the right to 
self-determination which their speech would be necessary for them to realize these 
rights.  
6.5 Questionable effectiveness of Holocaust denial and hate speech laws 
For all the arguments for and against Holocaust denial and hate speech, and whether it should 
be protected or prohibited, there are practical aspects to the debate that are often overlooked.  
First, are bans on hate speech effective in limiting the spread of racism, xenophobia and anti-
Semitism?  And, even beyond the problem of whether such laws are effective, there are the 
practical problems of enforcing such bans. 
There is no empirical proof that bans on hate speech are effective in preventing racism, 
xenophobia or anti-Semitism. While philosophical talk of whether hate speech has any 
value is an interesting debate, the moral justification for the imposition of often lengthy 
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prison sentences should rest on more than fear of a possible social changes; proof 
should be required of actual tangible affects.  This of course is a difficult concept to 
quantify, and it would be impossible on the micro level: how could one measure how 
offended someone was?  But on a macro level, there should be some evidence of a 
danger posed to the state which will be prevented by the law.  The difficult problem of 
providing empirical evidence is stated below: 
Germany’s experience with Nazism is often noted in explaining their current 
prohibitions on hate speech but it is less clear that this history shows that these 
prohibitions are now needed.  Historical accounts might find that racist hate speech 
prominent in periods leading up to the genocide.  But that finding would clearly not be 
enough.  It would not show whether this speech was causal or merely symptomatic, 
maybe even usefully symptomatic (in exposing a problem that needed to be dealt with), 
of deeper underlying forces.  And it would not show whether, even if causal in that 
historical context, it would be so under different historical conditions—for example, the 
conditions that exist in modern democracies.  Moreover, even if historically causal and 
potentially causal again, racist speech takes many forms and occurs in many contexts.  
Thus, the account would need to show, in addition, that the specific hate speech that 
proposed legal regulations would effectively prevent was at least a contributing cause 
of virulent racist or genocidal practices.107  
One argument that has been made is that hate speech deters participation of people in 
the political sphere.  
By regulating such speech [hate speech], the state sends a message to blacks or gays 
that their participation is welcome. 
There are certainly some practical problems with that view.  It makes a causal 
assumption that hate speech deters participation in public discourse, yet its proponents 
have never undertaken or cited serious empirical research to show that, in longstanding, 
stable, and prosperous democracies any such causal relationship exists (as opposed to 
societies such as Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia, where undeveloped public 
discourse could indeed lead to mass atrocities), no more than it has been shown that 
violence in the media breeds systemic social violence.  And it is questionable whether 
speech should be penalized on grounds of a wholly speculative causal link. In other 
words, there is no evidence that these aims of social inclusion are in fact promoted 
through hate speech bans.108  
Absent a clear causal link between hate speech and undesirable affects on society, there 
seems to be little justification for bans on hate speech other than communitarian or 
judicial dislike of such comments.   
[H]ate speech regulation is distinctive in that it seeks to repress speech merely because 
it has ‘the tendency’ to produce violence or disorder. Law that seeks to suppress speech 
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with this ‘tendency’ is in reality law that seeks to suppress violations of essential social 
norms.  
If we were truly serious about prohibiting speech that might cause actual racial or 
ethnic or national violence, we would proscribe much more than what is currently 
classified as hate speech.  We would proscribe all manner of cinema, novels, and 
popular entertainment.  That hate speech regulation does not reach anywhere near so far 
suggests that sociologically speaking, hate speech regulation is most essentially about 
suppressing speech that violates civility norms.  We may tell a story about the 
connection between hate speech and violence, but the actual shape of the law suggests 
that we are instead using law to enforce norms of propriety in sensitive areas like race, 
nationality, and ethnicity.  Even the branch of hate speech regulation that purports to 
turn on objective and empirical facts, like the causation of discrimination or violence, 
turns out on closer inspection to participate in the venerable tradition of using law to 
enforce essential community norms.109  
Even if one accepted that there was a clear causal link between hate speech and 
violence or fostering an environment that was conducive to a situation where genocide 
or crimes against humanity could be committed, one would still have to prove that hate 
speech regulation was effective in preventing such a situation.  Though, as the above 
quote points out, if that link were clear, violence in movies, TV shows, books and 
magazines would, and should be greatly curtailed because it would be causing a great 
number of social ills.110  While it is a sign of societal health that racist views are not 
accepted, the lack of evidence to suggest that merely hearing those views creates racism 
belies the argument for such legislation.   
Since there is no clear empirical evidence showing a link between extreme speech and 
these social ills, the question becomes: Is hate speech legislation legitimate and what is 
its effect?  Some commentators say that it only makes the problem worse by publicizing 
their views.  
Michael Whine’s chapter in this volume [Extreme Speech and Democracy], and 
Fraser’s as well, show that bans on Holocaust denial have by no means proved either 
effective or desirable as means of combating Holocaust denial.  Prosecutions for 
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Holocaust denial are precisely what nourish it: high profile trials engender sensational 
media attention, lending quasi-credibility to Holocaust deniers, which, in turn, contrary 
to the aims of the bans, actively encourages ongoing doubts about the existence or 
gravity of the Nazi extermination programmes.  No American Holocaust deniers have 
attained anything like the stature of Robert Faurisson in France, or indeed David Irving 
throughout much of Europe.  To the contrary, the absence of bans and the consequent 
absence of prosecutions in the US leave such figures consigned to the obscurity they 
deserve.111   
In the absence of evidence that Holocaust denial produces a negative effect and absent 
the clear determination that Holocaust denial legislation is an effective means of 
combating such negative effects, the only legitimate reason justifying Holocaust denial 
laws would be the psychological damage it does to people that hear it.  Generally, this is 
not enough to justify such criminal limitations.  Furthermore, the group that would be 
most traumatized by such speech is declining: 
Jews did suffer as the principal victims of Nazi ideology and practice.  The trauma 
which does surround denial for many members of various Jewish communities must not 
be dismissed or diminished.  But soon the biological reality of historical experience will 
take its final toll.  There will be no more survivors[…] In the near future, these systems 
will be forced to recognize a kind of communitarian, idealized second, and third 
generation traumatization in order to justify further legal interventions. That too must 
suffer serious, if not fatal, epistemological (not to mention slippery slope) 
difficulties.112 
With all these reasons dismissed, hate speech regulation of Holocaust denial seems to  
fail most obviously on pragmatic grounds. 
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7 Chapter 7: Reasons for protecting extreme and unpopular  speech  
There are several reasons why extreme and unpopular speech should be protected in 
order to further other interests of society.   
7.1  Freedom of speech is a component of the right to self-determination 
Article 1 of the ICCPR establishes the right to self-determination as a pre-eminent 
group right.  However, Article 1 needs to be interpreted within Article 5 of the 
Covenant, which is similar to Article 17 in the ECHR.  Article 5 states that none of the 
rights given can be used to undermine the rights of others.  These articles are seemingly 
contradictory and when read together seem to prohibit the very political speech which is 
clearly a necessary element of the right to self-determination.   
The view of Dr. Robert Post, Dean of Yale Law School and a prominent writer and 
lecturer on Constitutional law and freedom of speech,113 that racist speech should be 
immune from regulation within the public arena, is criticized by Professor Steven 
Heyman of Chicago-Kent School of Law as follows: 
Post contends that ‘racist speech is and ought to be immune from regulation within 
public discourse’. ‘[T]he value of self-determination,’ he writes, ‘requires that public 
discourse be open to the opinions of all.’  ‘If the state were to forbid the expression of a 
particular idea, heteronomous nondemocratic.’  This would violate the fundamental 
principle that (in the words of John Rawls) citizens should be treated ‘”in ways 
consistent with their being viewed as free and equal persons.”’[…] 
The problem with Post’s argument is that it fails to come to terms with the distinctive 
nature of hate speech.  Because hate speech denies recognition to other citizens, it is 
plainly incompatible with Piaget’s description of democracy as founded on ‘the mutual 
respect of autonomous wills,’ as well as with Post’s ‘image of independent citizens 
deliberating together to form public opinion’.  Hate speech disrespects the autonomy of 
others and refuses to deliberate with them.  In these ways, it tends to undermine rather 
than promote the formation of a genuinely common will.114  
While the argument against Post’s claim is true with respect to speech intended to 
intimidate or incite violence, it does not seem valid with regard to the expression of 
such views in the context of normal political discourse.  Such a rule would seem to 
prevent one segment of society from advocating the advancement of their political 
rights in any way which diminished the rights of others, even through legally 
permissible means.  If one has the right to self-determination, it then follows that one 
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must be allowed to advocate greater representation or other forms of government.  A 
strict interpretation of such a rule would mean that the status quo could never be 
changed, even through legal means, since inevitably the rights of others would be 
affected.    
7.2 Permitting extreme and unpopular speech may produce a stronger society 
The argument in favor of laws prohibiting Holocaust denial and other hate speech is 
that they protect society from the expression of extreme right wing views which 
are associated with the rise of National Socialism and the atrocities committed by the 
Nazis before and during World War II.  It is thought that there is little social value in 
letting people express such abhorrent views. 115  Why would one tolerate such speech 
when Germany and Europe have fears of the re-emergence of extreme ideologies such 
as fascism and the dangers it might represent to the whole of Europe? 
 These restrictions on speech are seen to be beneficial to society by limiting the 
influence of potentially dangerous ideologies, but the opposite might just as well be 
true.  One argument for allowing such speech which was advanced on a philosophical 
level by John Stuart Mills in his treatise “On Liberty” is that laws regulating speech can 
leave the population defenseless against these pernicious ideas since they have never 
really had to confront them in a way that made them defend their ideas.  Mills stated: 
[E]ven if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is 
suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most 
of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little 
comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, 
the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, 
and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming 
a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and 
preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or 
personal experience.116 
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Some democracies justify the protection of extreme speech in that exposure to vigorous 
debate of even the most obnoxious views results in a stronger society that is more 
resistant to such extreme views and, therefore, more able to rationally determine their 
own form of society and government.  Suppression of such ideologies merely drives 
them underground where they can fester, undetected for years before emerging in new 
and more virulent forms.117  People who experienced the Holocaust know National 
Socialism for what it is, but that generation is dying off.  A new generation that has not 
been exposed to such extreme ideologies and has not been subject to the necessity to 
discuss and debate them, may not be as well prepared to deal with the re-emergence of 
such ideologies. Simply accepting that National Socialism is bad, because you have 
been told that it is, produces a weaker belief than if you have examined the subject 
yourself and come to your own conclusions.  It is as if, when you are inoculated with 
the virus of extreme thought, you form an immunity to it118.  When people are 
confronted with disagreeable ideas, they can educate themselves and be better informed 
than if they had never come in contact with them. Many people believe that many that 
by allowing full and free discussion of the most heinous beliefs, the people of a society 
become better equipped to make good decisions about how their society and 
government should be organized.   
Furthermore, open discussion permits the pressure of such movements to be vented over 
time under favorable conditions when society is strong enough to deal with them, rather 
than erupting violently at time when the society has been weakened by other political or 
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economic events.  If Germany had had a history of free and open political discussion, 
instead of just having emerged from a monarchy under the Kaiser which restricted 
political debate and democratic institutions, the German people might have been better 
prepared to withstand the false appeal of National Socialism.  The economic collapse of 
the German economy following World War I also weakened ability of the German 
people to properly assess the issues, since a desperate society is more likely to turn to 
extreme means to alleviate its situation and even given such extreme circumstances, 
there is no evidence of speech being the cause, rather than merely a symptom.  
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8 Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Holocaust denial is clearly repugnant speech and something which society would surely 
benefit from being free from, at least in its most virulent form, but there is a great price 
which society must pay in order to be free from such speech.  Freedom of speech is an 
essential part of democracy and requires people to be tolerant of the opinions of others 
even if those people whose opinions are not tolerant of others.  
  
Noam Chomsky, a prominent liberal writer and scholar, wrote in a letter defending 
Robert Faurisson, a notorious Holocaust denier.  In his letter, Chomsky wrote “it is a 
truism, hardly deserving discussion, that the defense of the right of free expression is 
not restricted to ideas one approves of, and that it is precisely in the case of ideas found 
most offensive that these rights must be most vigorously defended.  Advocacy of the 
right to express ideas that are generally approved is, quite obviously, a matter of no 
significance.”119  
Much time has passed since the commission of the atrocities associated with the 
Holocaust and there is little evidence of the ill effects of Holocaust denial.  The fact that 
there have been no serious attempts to revive National Socialist ideology during this 
long period clearly undermines the argument that Holocaust denial legislation is 
necessary and legitimate in present day Europe.  The courts have been uneven in their 
application of hate legislation.  Courts tend to be conservative and, as guardians of the 
status quo, their role as protectors of the prevailing social norms constitutes a clear 
threat to the fundamental rights of new minority groups.  The courts have few criteria 
upon which to justify excluding some speech from protection while protecting other 
speech, other than the fact that they find it offensive and unpalatable.  By preventing 
speech that is not within acceptable social norms, the society is deprived of the vibrant 
interplay of ideas that are necessary for the functioning of a society.  
Europe has instituted programs to educate people on the atrocities of the Holocaust.  
This is clearly appropriate since everyone with an interest in humanity should have a 
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clear understanding of the atrocities which occurred.   However, legislation which 
outlaws speech that denies even the occurrence of factual events has not been shown to 
equip a society to prevent the rise of hatred or bigotry.  The social value of such works 
of revisionism should be determined through education by means of open discussion 
outside the courtroom, since judicial sanctions against publication of ideas would 
clearly have a tremendous “chilling effect” on scholarly work.  Gordon A. Craig, a 
prominent scholar of German history and a professor of history at Princeton and 
Stanford Universities, wrote in the New York Review of Books that one of David 
Irving’s books was “the best study we have of the German side of the Second World 
War” and he contended that it was “indispensable” in studying that period.120  David 
Irving is a notorious Holocaust denier.121  The fact that at least some very reputable 
academics think that there might be merit in some of these works seems to indicate that 
the debate should take place among historians and not before judges.  
The defendants in most landmark decisions upholding freedom of speech have been 
reprehensible people who have said extremely offensive things.  That is the 
battleground on which freedom of speech is fought.  People who express socially 
acceptable ideas that no one finds objectionable do not challenge the prevailing beliefs 
of a society.  Those who express generally accepted ideas are not prosecuted.  It is in 
the area of expression of extreme or unpopular ideas that the right of freedom of speech 
is defined.  Protection of those who express unpopular ideas strengthens the protection 
for everyone.  While speech that everyone agrees with does have some value in a 
democratic society in expressing the common values that hold a society together, it does 
not lead people to question their basis assumptions about the world.  The value of 
dissenting ideas is that they enable people to think about and test the validity of the 
common assumptions upon which a society is based.  This makes for a stronger and 
more vibrant society, since its beliefs have been tested in open debate against other 
alternatives.      
While fear of a repeat of the Holocaust is clearly something that is legitimate, the lack 
of any clear link between Holocaust denial and a future repetition of such an event 
                                               
120 D. D. Guttenplan, Is a Holocaust Skeptic Fit to Be a Historian?, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1999 
121 See the English High Court ruling in the David Irving libel suit, reported in The Guardian (April 
11,2000). 
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leaves grave questions as to whether such prohibitions can be justified.  The fame and 
notoriety afforded to people who are tried on charges of Holocaust denial and hate 
speech can easily lead one to the conclusion that such laws actually promote, rather than 
prevent, the spread of extreme viewpoints.  Also, blaming the propagation of hate 
speech as the sole or determinative cause of the atrocities committed during World War 
II, would be a flawed interpretation of history, since many causes contributed to the 
horrible extermination of a defenseless people.  
The American system of dealing with speech seems to provide adequate protection to 
people and society without unnecessarily limiting the rights of individuals.  It would 
seem that tolerance is the great lesson that should be learned from the atrocities of 
World War II, and that book burning itself may have as negative effect on respect for 
human rights as tolerating false and repugnant speech.   
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